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Strategy, Theory, and History: Operation Husky 1943  
Abstract In his 1987 work ‘Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace’, Edward Luttwak described 
strategy as a field of activity characterised not only by an innately complex relationship 
between designs, actions, and outcomes, but so too by the frequent disparity between its 
theory and praxis. Similar observations on this subject have since been made by Richard K. 
Betts, Lawrence Freedman and Antulio Echavarria II. This article will use the Allied invasion 
of Sicily July-August 1943 as vehicle through which to test these theories against a signal 
event in the European theatre of World War Two. It will illustrate how Operation Husky and 
its aftermath are a paradigm of the confusing and often illogical course of events associated 
with the process of formulating strategy and waging war. In so doing it demonstrates the 
benefits of using strategic theory to illuminate events and so move beyond the often insular 
focus of campaign histories, and simultaneously reinforces the importance of military history 
in informing a theoretical understanding of strategy. 
 
Keywords: Second World War, Sicily, Strategy, Strategic Theory. 
  I: Introduction 
Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, fits neatly within the familiar narrative 
of Allied operations in Europe during the Second World War. A pivotal event within that 
narrative, it has been the subject of a number of studies examining its genesis, planning, and 
prosecution.1  However, despite doing much to further our understanding of the campaign 
itself, historians have tended to consider Operation Husky from a predominantly 
operational perspective; understandably so given the novelty, brutality and ultimately the 
controversy of its undertaking as the initial Allied landing on ‘Fortress Europe’. Yet although 
its significance within the broader sweep of Allied Mediterranean strategy and the debates 
therein is acknowledged, studies have seldom sought deeper insight into what that 
campaign might actually tell us about the subject of strategy itself; its conception, its nature, 
its ability to regulate outcomes, and the effects of these outcomes upon the course of 
events as we know them. This is the symptom of a broader trend within ‘operational’ 
military history, namely to privilege an essentially positivist, orderly viewpoint of strategy; 
its conception, its formulation and its course. This article takes an alternative approach of 
borrowing from theoretical discussions of strategy and its nature to consider the Allied 
                                                          
1 Sir Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (Greenhill Books, London 1993), 
Douglas Porch’s Hitler’s Mediterranean Gamble: The North African and the Mediterranean Campaigns in World 
War II (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 2004), Gerhard Weinberg’s World at Arms: a Global History of World 
War II (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994),  Simon Ball, Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for 
the Mediterranean (Harper Press, London, 2010) and also ‘The Mediterranean and North Africa’ in J. Ferris and 
E. Mawdsley, The Cambridge History of the Second World War Volume 1: Fighting the War (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2015) 358-389. With respect to the intelligence and deception campaigns that 
underpinned Allied strategy in that theatre see  F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its 
Influence on Strategy and Operations Volumes 2 (HMSO, London 1981), and volume 3, Part 1 (HMSO, London 
1984), Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (Pimlico, London 1990), and Michael 
Handel (ed) Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (Frank Cass, London 1987). 
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invasion of Sicily in a different light. It argues that whilst Operation Husky is undoubtedly a 
fascinating subject for scholars of tactics and operations, its study can also serve a far 
broader purpose; namely educating us to the variables and consequences at play in terms of 
the broader management of war.  In that respect, Operation Husky deserves to be seen not 
only as a stepping-stone in the Allied defeat of Germany but as a looking-glass through 
which to identify certain truths about the prosecution of war; namely the relationship 
between military operations and strategic ‘ends’, the inherent tensions between design and 
causation, and the dissonance between the theory and practice of strategy. 2  Husky and its 
aftermath offer a valuable vantage point in these respects. Although a neat and self-
contained campaign it resided in the midst of a much wider web of actions and 
relationships, enabling us to judge the interplay of a variety of operational and strategic 
issues across time and space. Time in the sense of that period from late 1942 to autumn 
1943 that encompassed Husky’s planning, prosecution and aftermath; space in the sense of 
a range of military and diplomatic actions, by both Allies and Axis, reaching from the 
Mediterranean through the Balkans to the Russian steppe. For both sides, the choices and 
actions undertaken within these temporal and spatial parameters provide examples of the 
counterintuitive nature of strategy, and indeed war itself. 
It should be emphasised therefore that this article is not intended to be an 
operational account of the invasion of Sicily. Neither does it promise to reveal hitherto 
unseen evidence in relation to the event – one suspects that the archives have been picked 
clean in that respect. What is does do, however, is use the example of this particular event 
as a way of articulating three particular themes in relation to the study of strategy. At first 
glance, this may appear a tired avenue of approach in relation to Operation Husky, so long 
the centrepiece in a long-standing historical debate over the merits of the Allies’ 
Mediterranean strategy in the Second World War. But whereas that debate has traditionally 
centred upon the respective merits of rival political and military visions in application to the 
Allied campaign against Germany, what has not been explored is the relationship between 
Operation Husky and the nature of strategy itself. The first theme of this essay therefore is 
to provide that insight by relating the invasion of Sicily to a variety of arguments offered by 
strategic theorists intended to encourage us to think more carefully about the degree of 
rational control that exists in the formulation and implementation of strategy and the 
prosecution of war. 3  The second theme explored is the utility of history in providing weight 
to these theoretical observations. By using the detail provided by that history we can more 
properly illuminate the complex and contingent nature of strategy in terms of its 
formulation and implementation in war, and the uneven consequences that accrue.  Lastly, 
                                                          
2This article utilises Hew Strachan’s definition of strategy as, ‘the control and direction of war’. See The 
Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, 2012), 56.  
3 Ibid,54. The matter is not helped by rival intellectual perspectives. Thomas Schelling viewed strategy not 
solely as the management of war, but also the potential use of force i.e. deterrence. See The Strategy of 
Conflict (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1960), 9. 
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the essay engages at a broader level with the subject of military history itself and what its 
proper focus should be – a debate articulated initially by Hans Delbruck,  reiterated by 
Theodor Ropp in the 1940s, by Peter Paret and Sir Michael Howard in the 1960’s and 70’s, 
and lately reinforced by Hew Strachan.4 Robert Citino states – accurately - that the ‘big tent’ 
of military history is unparalleled in its potential sophistication and breadth. But Strachan 
observes an emerging ‘chasm’ between operational military historians on the one side and 
theorists of war on the other.5 As he argues, for military history to provide the requisite 
intellectual gravity, and to do due service to itself, it needs to approach the ideal embodied 
by Howard, (and indeed Strachan himself), in whose form operational history and a deep 
knowledge of strategic theory encompassed one another.6 This article argues in support of 
Strachan’s perspective.7 If overly conventional and prescriptive in its analysis, if tending 
toward an antiquarian and intellectually incurious version of events that ignores wider 
political and social contexts, or if promoting linear narratives over the realm of contingent 
‘possibilities’ that frames the outcome of military operations, then operational history fails 
in its potentially vital contribution to our understanding of war in a wider sense. But if 
utilised with these wider perspectives in mind, it provides a crucial bridge to alternative 
intellectual approaches to the subject. 
This article does not pretend ownership or originality over the concepts that it uses, 
but it does seek to apply them in a combination that is seldom seen. It is intended to 
advertise a more methodologically diverse and questioning approach to the study of military 
history, one that in particular can encourage and reinforce an accurate understanding of the 
purpose and nature of strategy in the conduct of war. In return, it emphasises to historians 
the potential value of theory to their own analysis of events. And ultimately, it hopes to 
encourage a new way of looking at signal event of the Second World War. 
 
Theory and Strategy 
There exists a certain dissonance between the theory of strategy and common 
understanding of the concept. This is not the fault of theorists. Rather it is the fault of a 
reductive approach to the teaching of teaching of strategy. For ease of comprehension this 
tends to emphasise neat hierarchies and logical relationships, none more so than the ‘ends-
ways-means’ dynamic beloved of military academies.8 This frequently prescriptive approach 
                                                          
4 Ropp, ‘The Teaching of Military History’ Military Affairs, 13/1 (1949), 14-19, Paret, ‘The History of War’ 
Daedelus, 100/2 (1971), 376-396 
5 See R.M. Citino, ‘Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction’, The American Historical Review Vol. 112, 
No. 4 (Oct, 2007), 1070-1090 and Strachan, ‘The Study of War at Oxford 1909-2009’ in C. Hood, D. King and G. 
Peele, Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics and 
International Relations in Comparative Perspective (Oxford, 2014), 204-224 
6 Michael Howard,  The Use and Abuse of Military History, RUSI Journal, 107/625 (1962),  6 
7 As Paret stated: ‘[T]he largely narrative, unanalytic treatment of military operations…was not conducive to 
the development of creative historical hypotheses, or to the closer integration of military history with other 
kinds of history’ Understanding War, (Princeton, 1993),  217 
8 Ends equal objectives, means equal resources, and strategy comprises the ‘ways’ that link the two together.  
See Stephen Miller, ‘On Strategy Grand and Mundane’ Orbis 60:2 (Spring 2016), 237-247. With respect to 
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encourages a false confidence in sequences, order and cohesion. It envisages easily 
identifiable and fixed ‘ends’, subscribed and adhered to by a range of political and military 
actors working in unison with one another. It promotes the sanctity of ‘policy’ as a method 
of controlling war - rather than acknowledging war’s tendency to shape policy instead - and 
it leaves unsaid the input provided by blind fortune and by an intelligent and reactive 
opponent. Without taking these sorts of considerations into account, our often superficial 
understanding of strategy as an ordered application of resources in pursuit of political ends 
provides a sanitized and unhelpful articulation of the concept. In practice, of course, matters 
generally refuse to obey such neat rules, as the theorist Edward Luttwak illustrated by 
describing strategy’s tendency toward ‘paradox, irony and contradiction’.9  As any military 
historian or strategic theorist knows, defeats can be advantageous, victories less so. 
Mistakes at the tactical level can lead to success at the operational level; success at the 
operational level can lead to failure at the strategic level.  
So what does this mean in relation to Operation Husky? Firstly, if as Luttwak states 
there is no natural harmony between the levels of war, then a study of that campaign and 
its aftermath tests assertions concerning the ability (or otherwise) of military operations to 
provide chosen strategic outcomes; a matter of  relevance both to historians and theorists.10 
Secondly, as a case study it also helps test and clarify his notions of ‘paradox, irony and 
contradiction’ in terms of the way that strategy may ultimately deliver effect. Lastly it 
supports one of his less prominent but still highly valuable observations, namely that the 
theoretical superiority of proper strategic conduct can often be disputed in practice.11  
 The first point is a crucial one, both in terms of interpreting an historical event but so 
too when contemplating the broader use of military power in the service of political designs. 
As Antulio Echavarria reminds us, there is a fundamental requirement to visualise strategy 
not as a set of independent and controllable variables, (resources, alliances, the shaping of 
one’s capabilities, the sequencing of military operations and the selection of aims) but 
rather as the management of the chaotic interplay between innumerable dependent ones, 
i.e. one’s own designs and capabilities versus the dynamics of rival alliances; the acumen 
and judgement of enemy political leaders; the capabilities of, and resources open to, their 
military commanders; the relationship between those military and political elites; and of 
course pure luck (good or bad), to name but a few. Only with these volatile and 
uncontrollable dynamics in mind can we begin to understand the challenge of employing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
military teaching see H. Richard Yarger, ‘Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College 
Strategy Model’ in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd ed., ed. J. Boone 
Bartholomees (Department of National Security and Strategy, Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2006) 
108. 
9  Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace , (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 2002)  xii 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid, 234 
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power as an accurate instrument of political intent.12  For both the Allies and Axis, Husky 
and its aftermath emphasise such vital yet often hidden relationships.  
On the second issue, that of ‘paradox, irony and contradiction’, theorists adopts 
slightly differing viewpoints. Echavarria for example argues that the substantive meaning of 
the term ‘paradox’ when applied to strategy is unhelpful for a variety of reasons, not least 
because an apparent paradox is often, technically, nothing of the sort. 13  Heeding 
Echavarria’s warnings this article nevertheless contends that the term retains value if 
understood in the broader sense advocated by Thomas Schelling i.e. as a contravention of 
common sense, or accepted rules.14 Such an understanding may open one up to accusations 
of imprecision, but it serves to provide useful and tangible explanation as to the confusing 
flow of events in war, and in relation to Husky in particualr. 
  The final point made by Luttwak; that relating to the inherent possibility of ‘proper’ 
strategic conduct needing to be overturned in war, is fundamental to any discussion 
regarding the balance between theory and practice. Luttwak refrained from offering any 
further substantive detail, but his observation touches upon concepts explored in much 
greater depth by others. Richard Betts’ exploration of the myriad complexities of actually 
enacting strategy leaves him seemingly sceptical of its utility as a practicable concept. In 
particular, he observed fundamental problems with the notion of the seemingly sacrosanct 
triptych of ends, ways and means and strategy’s role in relating those three elements. 
Specifically, Betts identifies the way that this theoretical understanding of how strategy 
works sits in opposition to the actual nature of war, which as he points out exists to serve 
itself, not policy. The notion of an ordered and controlled sequence of moves in pursuit of 
fixed political ends is thus a dangerous illusion.15 This perspective echoes that held by 
Lawrence Freedman; that strategy is too readily misconceived as a rigid process that 
envisages an ordered and pre-ordained sequence of events that obey neat theoretical 
precepts. Instead, he argues, it is more accurately described a relatively modest process; a 
form of muddling through that simply creates new realities to be contested in turn. It is, he 
proposes, a matter of ‘stages’ rather than ‘conclusions’.16  
Operation Husky provides rich evidence in support of such theoretical observations. 
Its planning, undertaking and aftermath reveal certain of Schelling’s ‘paradoxical’ elements. 
It is a model of Echavarria’s ‘dependent variables’, and of Freedman’s ‘muddling through’. 
It is an example of how established principles of strategic theory appear to founder in 
contact with the realities of the situation as they stood, and yet it still witnesses beneficial 
                                                          
12 Antulio Echavarria II, ‘Preparing for One War and Getting Another?’ (Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 
2010), 6 
13 Ibid 3-4. Echavarria states that paradoxes are usually resolvable. Eventually, we either find (1) the essential 
item of information that reconciles contradictory statements, or (2) that the premises of one or all statements 
are false, or (3) that apparent the paradox was based upon hasty generalizations 
14 Schelling, 18. 
15 Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’ International Security, 25:2 (2000) 37 
16 Freedman, Strategy: A History (OUP, Oxford, 2013), 726 
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outcomes  for those protagonists that declined to be bound by hierarchies, and who were 
able to best manage changing circumstances.17 Crucially, it also serves to illustrate how 
politics provides logic to what would otherwise appear illogical acts and outcomes from a 
purely theoretical perspective. 
 Importantly, in order to give weight to the argument, this essay will rely upon 
counterfactual reasoning to agree. This is deemed appropriate for two reasons. Firstly, any 
analysis that unpicks the explanations as to why decisions are made or not made in terms of 
their perceived causality, and examines the tensions between actual outcomes and the 
alternative futures that may have played out in their place, tends towards the 
counterfactual.18 Secondly, such analytical techniques are not the preserve of the fantasist. 
Used to great intellectual effect in Julian Jackson’s studious examination of the fall of France 
1940, other noted military historians such as Denis Showalter and Gerhard Weinberg have 
utilised the same methodology.19 As the historian and theorist Patrick Porter reasons, 
‘Predicting the past and imagining paths not taken is speculative. But any argument about 
causality is counterfactual’. To that end, he argues, we can make informed guesses in an 
‘evidence-rich’ environment in order to estimate alternative futures.20  
 
Structure and Background 
In order to best apply the theoretical insights explained above, the article will provide a brief 
outline of Operation Husky for those unfamiliar with the narrative, before examining four 
distinct aspects of the event itself. The first of these will be its genesis at the Casablanca 
conference of January 1943, and which will illustrate the problem of visualising strategy as a 
neat interlinking of means and ends. The second aspect examined will be the Axis 
preparations for the defence of Sicily, and the seemingly paradoxical dynamics undermining 
the German ability to successfully protect such a vital yet defensible position. The third 
aspect examined will be the ways in which Operation Husky related to events on the Eastern 
Front during the summer of 1943, and the degree to which seemingly positive strategic 
effects for the Allies could hide genuinely quite counterproductive outcomes. Lastly it will 
examine Husky’s effect upon subsequent events in Italy. Aside from illustrating the (again) 
counterproductive consequences of a supposedly beneficial outcome, in this case the 
collapse of the Mussolini regime, it will examine the extent to which Allied strategy was not 
simply a closed cosmos of Anglo-US deliberations, but rather an ‘open’ system, deeply 
exposed and highly vulnerable to contingency. 
                                                          
17 Betts, 36. 
18 Particularly Carlo D’Este’s Bitter Victory (Harper, London, 2008) which remains the most comprehensive 
study of the Sicily campaign to date  
19 See Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford University Press, 2001), particularly his 
chapter ‘Causes, Consequences and Counterfactuals’ pp. 185-228, Harold Deutsch and Denis Showalter (eds) 
What if? Strategic Alternatives of World War II (Chicago, Emperor Press 1997). 
20 See ‘A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in World War Two’ Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (2012), 
317-343. 
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Operation Husky 10th July -17th August 1943 
Between 9th July and 17th August 1943, Allied forces mounted an operation to secure the 
Island of Sicily from Axis control. Commencing with large scale airborne and seaborne 
landings, the operation soon degenerated into a desperately contested land campaign. US 
forces in the form of 7th Army under the command of General George Patton alongside the 
Anglo-Canadian forces of General Bernard Montgomery’s 8th Army fought bitterly to take 
control as heavily outnumbered Axis units, in the face of immense pressure, sought to 
conduct an orderly retreat to the Italian mainland. A seeming lack of clear intent on the part 
of General Harold Alexander, in control of the land campaign, combined with the wilfulness 
of both Montgomery and Patton caused the Allied effort to fracture into two largely 
separate efforts to the great benefit of German commanders.21 Combined with an inability 
to harness their dominance in the air and at sea as part of a wider ‘operational’ design in 
concert with land forces, the Allies were forced to watch as the Axis evacuated over 100,000 
troops to the mainland almost entirely unhindered. The success of the latter event in 
particular, as well as the stuttering performance of Allied commanders, caused observers at 
the time, and historians subsequently, to lament Husky as a missed opportunity to deliver a 
comprehensive defeat upon German forces. The author of perhaps the best operational 
history of the campaign, Carlo D’Este, would later condemn Operation Husky as a ‘Bitter 
Victory’. 
 
I: Ends and Ways 
The paradoxical character of the Allied Mediterranean campaign in World War II has already 
been highlighted courtesy of recent literature on the topic.22 As historians have noted, 
triumph in North Africa in the spring of 1943 delivered the defeat of Axis combat power on 
that continent but it also, unhelpfully, delivered a form of strategic ‘pull’ that sucked the 
Allies onward in the search for continued success. This deeply antagonised senior US 
strategists who feared the inexorable dilution of their vision for the defeat of Germany. In 
such a way, success had led inexorably to tension and division. In application to Husky 
however, such logic would be reversed. By way of a thorough corruption of the proper 
principles of strategy, tension and division would create the necessary ‘space’ for success to 
occur. 
Any student of Anglo-US relations during this period knows that January-April 1943 
was a time of tension, uncertainty and ambiguity where respective visions of the 
                                                          
21 Alexander was commander 15th Army Group. He was in effect in control of the land campaign, while his 
superior, General Dwight Eisenhower, attended to broader strategic and political considerations. Such a 
command structure prohibited  the unifying of a theoretically joint campaign due to the former’s lack of 
authority and the latter’s distraction with other matters. 
22 M.K.Barbier, ‘The War in the West 1943-45’ in Ferris and Mawdsley, The Cambridge History of the Second 
World War Volume 1: Fighting the War, 389-419 
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Mediterranean theatre were concerned. Although the inter-Allied conference at Casablanca 
in January had agreed that Sicily would be the appropriate target following victory in North 
Africa, there existed significant and potentially divisive differences of opinion between 
British and American service chiefs as to how the military effort should flow from that 
point. 23  It should be emphasized that the ultimate political authorities in question, 
Roosevelt and Churchill, were essentially unified in their respective understandings that 
operations should continue to focus on the Mediterranean theatre, although opinion was 
divided as to precisely where in the Mediterranean. Therefore the evident tensions should 
not be misinterpreted as being politically more serious than they were.24 But rough political 
unity could not forge military-strategic synergy among the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS); 
the senior Allied military caucus responsible for both advising its political leaderships, and 
devising and enabling the most appropriate strategies for the global war against the Axis. 
On the question of Mediterranean strategy, divisions within the CCS were carved 
along roughly national lines. British representatives under the guidance of General 
Alanbrooke, Britain’s Chief of the Imperial General Staff, heavily favoured a commitment to 
Italy subsequent to the successful conclusion of the Sicilian campaign.25  Within the US chain 
of command General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army and Roosevelt’s 
principal military adviser, and Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of the Naval Staff, viewed any 
tendency toward continued operations in the Mediterranean post-Sicily with deep 
suspicion.26 Marshall in particular maintained fundamental objections to an indirect strategy 
that placed Italy, rather than northern France, at the centre of any strategy to defeat 
Germany. Although eventually convinced at Casablanca to give his blessing to Husky, he 
steadfastly refused to sanction further military operations in the Mediterranean subsequent 
to its conclusion.27 As late as 25 April 1943 he declared emphatically that such operations 
(Sicily, et al) "[A]re not in keeping with my ideas of what our strategy should be. The decisive 
effort must be made against the continent from the United Kingdom sooner or later." 28 In 
fact his eventual agreement to the notion of an invasion of the Italian mainland would not 
come until 16 July 1943, four months after Casablanca and in in the midst of the Sicilian 
campaign itself. His subordinate General Albert Wedermeyer, a committed advocate of 
                                                          
23 See Barr, Yanks and Limeys, (Vintage, London, 2016) 140-142, Sir John Kennedy, The Business of War (Walter 
Millis, London 1958), 279-288, and Alex Danchev, Dan Todman, Alanbrooke: War Diaries (Wiedenfield and 
Nicholson, London 2002), 465-470 
24 For more on this debate see Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Volume 4: September 1942-August 1943, 
(HMSO, London 1970) passim 
25 General Dwight D. Eisenhower was an advocate of an invasion of Italy, as were USAAF officers who eyed 
airbases on the mainland for strategic bombers to carry the war to southern Germany. See M. Matloff, 
Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44 (Centre for Military History, US Army 1994), 153. However, 
neither Eisenhower nor the USAAF had any significant influence over Allied strategy in the Mediterranean at 
this stage. 
26 Wedermeyer, a graduate of the German Kriegsacademie 1936-38, was the author of the so-called ‘Victory 
Programme’. On the role of Wedermeyer in devising the concepts underpinning US war planning see Barr, 114-
155 
27 Ibid 220-223. Barr highlights the antipathy displayed by Marshall toward any overt agreement to an Italian 
campaign post-Husky. Marshall was President Roosevelt’s most valued military advisor. 
28 Matloff, 75.  
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early landings in N.W. Europe in 1943, remained thoroughly unconvinced even of Husky’s 
merits. 29 
The Allies therefore entered the post-Casablanca phase in a conceptual limbo as to 
the intended aims of their next operational ‘leap’. The point has been made by historians of 
course that the decision to invade Sicily was lent necessary intellectual and thus strategic 
coherence by virtue of its relationship to broader grand-strategic objectives. Specifically the 
requirement to free up lines of communication through the Mediterranean for the benefit 
of logistical preparations for Overlord; as a method of dealing a fatal blow to the rotten 
structure of Italian fascism, and as a way of relieving pressure upon the Eastern Front. But in 
reality that coherence was illusory. As admitted by Britain’s senior naval commander in the 
Mediterranean the possession of Sicily provided little increased protection to Allied lines of 
communication through the Mediterranean. 30  Furthermore, Britain’s Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) admitted that while the invasion of Sicily might deal a fatal blow to 
Mussolini’s regime, such effect could be equally accomplished by landings elsewhere.31 As 
for impacting German fortunes on the Eastern Front, such impact was not necessarily wholly 
beneficial to Allied interests, as will be illustrated. While previous and subsequent Allied 
operations in the Mediterranean displayed a firm adherence to the theoretical ideals of 
strategy making in the sense of displaying an understanding as to precisely what they were 
designed to achieve, Husky did not. 
In practice therefore, although the invasion of Sicily was agreed as an objective the 
intended outcome was fundamentally ambiguous and thus open to interpretation by all 
parties. The practical implication of this was that conditions necessary to achieve a unified 
vision of where Allied strategy should go post-Husky would therefore have to be generated 
by military action. In other words battle, or the prospect thereof, would have to create 
strategy, or at least create the conditions by which strategy could be made. This stood as a 
fundamental reversal of the ideal, whereby tactical actions were to be mounted pursuant of 
stated strategic objectives.32 Why this should be so problematic lay in the theoretical basis 
of how to arrange these tactical actions in the absence of clearly identifiable and agreed 
upon objectives. In such a scenario operational commanders ran the risk of fashioning their 
enterprises without a firm understanding of what precisely these were designed to achieve, 
a phenomenon that might lead to a series of un-coordinated engagements with little 
overarching coherence. Such was the spectre that Soviet theorists of the 1920’s and 30’s 
had sought to avoid, and such is the accusation levelled at Operation Husky.33 That as a 
                                                          
29 For more on General Albert Wedermeyer , see Barr, 141-2. 
30 Ball, ‘The Mediterranean and North Africa 1940-1944’, 364 
31 The National Archives, Kew, London, [Hereafter referred to as TNA] CAB (Cabinet Papers) 121/152 COS (S) 
‘Symbol Conference at Casablanca between UK and USA January 1943, 12th Meeting 21st January 1943. The 
Joint Intelligence Committee recommended Sardinia as a more suitable target in this respect. 
32 Higher level British doctrine stated that, ‘It is essential to decide on and clearly to define the aim that the 
use of force is intended to attain’. Field Service Regulations: Operations, Higher Formations (London, HMSO 
1935) 14 
33 David M.Glantz, ‘The Nature of Soviet Operational Art’ Parameters 15/1 Spring 1985, 2-13 
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consequence of the requirement to ameliorate political tensions at Casablanca, subordinate 
military planners were condemned to visualising it as an end in itself (the occupation of 
Sicily) rather than a means to an end (the destruction of German combat power on the 
island with a view to facilitating rapid exploitation on the mainland, for example).34 Hence, 
due to their being forced to envisage the operation in isolation from any subsequent 
exploitation of changed circumstances, the military planning staff were forced to craft an 
inherently conservative, short-sighted and uncoordinated plan, one that would allow the 
escape of over 100,000 enemy troops.35 
Ultimately it is fair to say that Operation Husky evolved as a plan that possessed 
some sense of what it was meant to achieve, but little sense of how to further capitalise 
upon that achievement – a corruption of the fundamentals of effective strategy-making. But 
for overwhelmingly important political reasons, strategy in any detailed sense was less 
important than the sheer necessity for action. A tactical enterprise would occur, and in the 
process create the necessary space for strategy to form. This may have contravened 
theoretical principles, but ambiguity and lack of direction suited Allied interests at that 
moment in time. Regardless of the primacy of civilian control, it was inconceivable for 
political leaders to publicly articulate future strategy without the support of their chief 
military advisors. As a consequence, the prospect of stipulating post-Husky strategy at 
Casablanca was highly undesirable. The British could not tolerate any answer other than 
continued operations in the Mediterranean; yet forcing Marshall to acquiesce to such a 
vision at this stage would have proved highly damaging to the critical relationship with his 
President. Indeed, so self-evident were these concerns that matters played out as they did 
at Casablanca.  
Did lack of consensus at Casablanca and in the initial months afterward have an 
effect upon Husky’s fortunes as a military enterprise? Many of those involved at the time, 
on both sides, castigated a campaign plan that appeared to eschew the chance of ‘decisive’ 
victory by deliberately avoiding creating the conditions necessary for such success to be 
achieved.36 This argument will be dealt with in greater depth later but it is undeniable that 
the military planning process was constrained by its inability to treat the Italian mainland as 
a fundamental or subsequent component of the campaign. The absence of any agreed sense 
of where Husky might lead ensured the failure to engineer at the outset the wholesale 
defeat of Axis forces on Sicily. The point, however, is not whether this state of affairs was 
problematic per se. In a purely military sense it may have been. But its disadvantages paled 
                                                          
34Both D’Este, Bitter Victory and Martin Blumenson, Sicily, Whose Victory? (Ballantine, 1972) adopt this 
narrative. 
35 For more on Husky’s planning, see TNA WO (War Office) 106 (War Office: Directorate of Military Operations 
and Military Intelligence, and predecessors: Correspondence and Papers) 5823 (planning for Husky) 1 Feb-31 
March 1943.  Mitcham and Stauffenberg state that 39,569 German combat troops and 62,000 Italian troops 
were evacuated. See The Battle of Sicily: How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total Victory (Stackpole, New 
York, 2007), 307.  
36 Simultaneous landings on Sicily and the Italian mainland in the Calabria region would, it has been argued, 
have created the conditions for encirclement, destruction, and ‘success’. See D’Este, 76 
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in comparison to the political flexibility afforded. In other words, and in contradiction of 
theoretical best practice, it was precisely the lack of clearly articulated ‘ends’ that served 
Allied interests so well. It allowed Husky to proceed as a concept and so preserved the 
momentum that would carry the Allies into Italy. By preventing an untimely confrontation at 
the highest levels over the setting forth of definite ‘next steps’, Husky was able to create 
the necessary politico-strategic conditions for consensus to be reached. 
 
II: German Decision-making and the ‘Paradox of Plenty’. 
The reasons for the Axis failure to prevent the capture of Sicily were multifarious. 
Undoubtedly, Allied deception operations found their target in a highly dysfunctional 
German intelligence apparatus. Although this article does not wish to re-tread the well-worn 
debate over the utility of Allied deception operations in relation to Husky, it is reasonable to 
accept that the misdirection created was a powerful distraction for a German high 
command confronted by so many seemingly credible targets for enemy action. 37  A 
distraction enhanced by its habit, Michael Handel observes, of continually interpreting 
potential Allied actions by way of a strategic culture that prioritised purely military 
considerations and failed to conceptualise how the Allies might unfurl their operations with 
grander designs in mind.38 But while these criticisms hold true in terms of German analysis 
of Allied objectives, they tend to marginalize a matter of fundamental importance to the 
German defence of Sicily, namely the fragile state of the Italian fascist Government by the 
early summer of 1943. This political aspect of the debate is central to understanding 
German decision making with respect to the defence of Sicily, and in the process illustrates 
additional factors that matter hugely with respect to Husky’s strategic narrative. In 
particular they echo certain of the observations made by Luttwak and Betts in particular. 
With respect to the former, we see emerging ‘paradox of plenty’ where the Axis is 
concerned. Large numbers of Italian divisions should have been perceived as a relative 
strength in the minds of German strategists contemplating a map of the Mediterranean at 
the same time as their Allied counterparts at Casablanca. Instead, from that same month 
those Italian divisions begin to inexorably assume the form of a critical vulnerability and 
ultimately a threat; a curse that transformed theoretical strength into a practical weakness, 
and which shaped German freedom of action where the defence of Sicily was concerned. 
Meanwhile, Betts’ observations regarding complexity and contingency require us to 
understand how Allied strategy was dependent not only upon its own designs, but also 
reliant for success upon frictions deep within the Axis system, frictions that were largely 
self-inflicted. 
                                                          
37 Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War Volume 3, 69-117 
38 Michael Handel, ‘Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective’ in Strategic and Operational 
Deception, 76 
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In the introduction to his edited volume on strategic and operational deception in 
World War Two, Handel engages in a lengthy dismissal of arguments proposed by those 
querying the importance of Allied deception in shaping German thinking and behaviours in 
the lead up to Husky.39 Whilst many of his observations hit the point squarely, there remain 
uncertainties in divining the precise reasons as to why significant numbers of German forces 
remained uncommitted to Sicily and Italy despite evident suspicions that the former was a 
likely target. 40  Even accounting for the uncertainty caused by Allied deception, the 
subsequent movement of German units to the Balkans, and the apparent belief by senior 
personalities within Hitler’s inner circle that Greece was the next target for Allied invasion, 
sufficient formations remained available to secure both Sicily and other threatened sectors 
in Italy.41 But while several of these divisions did move into Italy and Sicily during May and 
June 1943, the bulk of available divisions remained in France or Southern Germany.42 
Tasked with ensuring a swift, armed take-over of Italy in the case of a political collapse they 
were positioned in such a fashion that they could not be wholly consumed by the chaos of 
that collapse or by an armed revolution on the part of the still sizeable Italian Army.43  
Indeed, fears of this sort had an absolutely critical impact on Sicily itself. Field Marshal 
Albert Kesselring, C-in-C South and the commander responsible for determining the German 
defences on Sicily in the build up to Husky, purposely segregated the elite 15th Panzer 
Division from its Italian counterparts for fear of the latter’s treachery. This would have 
hugely significant consequences for the tactical defence of the island.44  
It is undeniable therefore that German strategizing with respect to the defence of 
Sicily was, in addition to Allied deception operations, fundamentally influenced by the 
increasing fragility of the Italian fascist regime.45 Seen from this perspective it could be 
argued that the defence of Sicily should have been made a priority lest its loss fatally 
undermine Mussolini. For the Germans however the priority over time was less a question 
of preventing a potential crisis, but being positioned securely if and when it happened.46 The 
resourcing of Sicily had to be placed in the context of a political crisis on the mainland that 
might see it, and potentially much of the Balkans courtesy of the huge Italian military 
                                                          
39 Klaus Jurgen-Muller ‘A German perspective on Allied Deception operations in the Second World War’ in 
Intelligence and National Security 2/3 (1987), 301-326. Handel questions Jurgen-Muller’s analysis but 
acknowledges that the effectiveness of Allied deception upon German thinking remained ‘circumstantial’. See 
his ‘Strategic and Operational Deception in Historical Perspective’, 80. 
40 Ibid,78. Handel acknowledges that the Allied bombing of Pantellaria, an Island fortress guarding the 
southern approaches to Sicily, roughly a month prior to Husky likely led the Germans to believe that Sicily was 
the target.  
41 Ibid,79. Handel is referring to General Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the OKW.  Muller states 
that 11 Divisions in total were under Army Group B’s command, of which only a small proportion were 
deployed into Italy prior to operation Husky. See ‘A German Perspective…’, 314 
42 Ehrman states that 8 full divisions were stationed near Munich in July for this purpose. See Grand Strategy 
Vol V The History of the Second World War (HMSO, London 1956),  65. 
43 Ibid 
44 D’Este states that Kesselring ‘[P]rudently dispersed his forces so as to be able to disarm the Italians in the 
event they defected’, 198. 
45 See Helmut Heiber and David M. Glantz, Hitler and his Generals: Military Conferences 1942-1945 (Greenhill 
Books, London 2002), 119-144                                                                                                                                                                                          
46 Ibid. 
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presence there, slip from Germany’s political and military orbit.47 The irony was this, 
however. In contemplating the unravelling of their political and military relationship with 
Italy in the spring of 1943, and the concomitant strategic dilemmas that accrued as a 
consequence, Hitler and the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) were confronting the 
consequences of Mussolini’s attempts to strengthen that very same relationship, an 
attempt which had only exacerbated the fundamental fault lines within. 48 
The key to such an observation lay not in Italy but in Russia, specifically the debacle 
at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942/3 where the 235,000 strong Italian 8th Army, acting in 
support of German forces, was to all intents and purposes destroyed. In conjunction with 
the loss of its 1st Army in Tunisia three months later, that destruction represented the end 
of Italy’s ability to carry out any effective defence of the homeland.49 But in political terms 
the losses in Russia were a different order of magnitude. Defeat in North Africa was the 
unfortunate result of an otherwise comprehensible strategy centred on Italy’s traditional 
sphere of influence. Not so Russia, where Mussolini’s demand for a military presence in 
support of Germany’s efforts had long antagonised his military commanders and threatened 
the legitimacy of his regime.50 The loss of those troops and the apparent circumstances in 
which many of those losses occurred was to have profound political consequences, resulting 
in significant changes at the head of the Italian Armed forces.51 As a direct result of events in 
Russia, Field Marshall Ugo Cavallero was replaced in January 1943 as Chief of the Defence 
Staff by General Vittorio Ambrosio. For Hitler and the OKW the latter’s openly hostile 
attitude, his desire to re-orientate the Italian war-effort away from the Balkans and Russia 
toward the protection of the homeland, and above all his perceived political unreliability, 
were of deep and sudden concern.52 So too was Germany’s position in the Balkans, where 
the implications of Italian politico-military upheaval upon this economic satrapy of the Reich 
suddenly loomed large.53 Such concerns were enhanced by evidence of a clique within 
Mussolini’s domestic political opposition exploring the notion of a separate peace with the 
                                                          
47 Italian commanders were engaged in clandestine arrangements with Partisan forces. See Jovan Marjanović, 
Mihailo Stanišić, The Collaboration of D. Mihailović's Chetniks with the enemy forces of occupation: 1941-1944 
(Beograd, Arhivski Pregled, 1976) passim. 
48 Translated as ‘Supreme Command of the Armed Forces’. By 1942 it had operational responsibility for the 
Mediterranean theatre although in reality this generally meant translating Hitler’s operational demands into 
reality. 
49 Italian divisions in the Balkans were, in reality, only suitable for anti-partisan activities. Those on Sicily and 
Sardinia were untested and of limited utility. 
50 Italian troops were first sent to Russia in the guise of the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (CSIR) until 
July 1942 when they were reinforced into the 235,000 strong Italian 8th Army and renamed the Armata 
Italiana in Russia (ARMIR)  
51 Italian formations in the vicinity of Stalingrad had been sacrificed by German commanders in order to 
safeguard the withdrawal of their own units. See Deakin, Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Collapse 
of Italian Fascism (Harpr and Row, London, 1962), 205. This was a common occurrence in North Africa. See 
Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein (Pimlico, London 2005), 399. 
52 Upon appointment, Ambrosio had immediately informed Mussolini that Italy was ‘not obliged to follow 
them [Germany] in their erroneous conduct of the war’. See Deakin, Brutal Friendship p 166. 
53 The German war effort drew 100 per cent of its chrome, 60 per cent of its bauxite, 50 per cent of its oil, and 
more than 20 per cent of its copper from the Balkans. 
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British and Americans in conjunction with Germany’s Balkan allies.54 The prospect of Italy, 
Romania and Hungary simultaneously deserting the Axis cause raised the possibility of 
cataclysmic damage to German interests. 55 The sudden German reinforcement of the 
Balkans in May 1943 may have been prompted by Allied deception but they also sent a 
convenient, obvious and timely reminder of German capabilities to its regional allies. 
This was the juncture at which the inherent politico-military frailties of the Axis, as 
well as the artificiality of its supposed community of interests, became a fundamental 
problem for those in charge of German strategy.56 It was the point at which Italy’s political 
weakness, a weakness caused ironically by a desire to strengthen relations with Germany, 
began to impinge upon a variety of the latter’s military, economic, political and diplomatic 
interests. The sudden presence of Ambrosio at the head of the Italian armed forces; growing 
evidence of a dissident faction within the top echelons of the Fascist regime; Mussolini’s 
vain attempts to strengthen his position by way of large-scale changes to his Government; 
the wavering loyalties of Antonescu and Horthy; these all impacted German priorities.57 The 
growing sense of potentially new political realities exerted increasing influence upon how 
Hitler and the OKW were forced to conceptualise the defence of Axis territory. As General 
Warlimont, Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff at OKW during this period observed in 
relation to Italy’s growing political crisis, ‘There were definite limitations on any German 
action which concerned Italian territory, whether or not it was intended to secure our own 
security in the event of Italy going out of the war’.58 
Sicily was an intractable problem for the Germans, a true Gordian knot. Its loss might 
trigger Italy’s political collapse, but the full range of resources that would guarantee its 
defence could not be deployed for fear of the same outcome occurring. A rational 
assessment of the dilemma led inevitably to one conclusion; that the ability of German 
forces to safely and rapidly secure both Italy and the Balkans if and when the Italian collapse 
came was a greater priority than the successful defence of Sicily, even if the loss of the latter 
might conceivably contribute to the former. As a consequence, German strategy was forced 
to follow an inherently paradoxical course. In order to best satisfy its own requirements, it 
simply help set the conditions for Allied success on Sicily, and thus brought about the very 
conditions that it so feared. 
 
III: Eastern Promises 
                                                          
54 Aside from Operation Mincemeat, that sought to convince the Germans that Sicily was to all intents and 
purposes a diversionary target, there were a number of deception operations designed to promote the notion 
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55 For Allied understanding of these tensions, see TNA HW (Intercepted enemy traffic) 1/1637 Portuguese 
Minister Budapest to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lisbon, 23 April 1943. 
56 For more on this period see Ball, Bitter Sea, 212-247 
57 Marshal Ion Antonescu and Admiral Miklos Horthy, respective leaders of Romania and Hungary. 
58 Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson 1962), 332 
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The third aspect of Husky worth examining is its relationship to Operation Citadel, the 
pivotal German offensive at Kursk in July 1943.59 This is a comparatively subtle aspect of the 
Husky debate but it reminds us to consider the implied logic of how events evolved, and 
whether our understanding of the relationship between Operations Husky and Citadel may 
require some adjustment. 60   
On 4th July 1943 and after months of preparation the Germans began their attempt 
to sever the Kursk salient; a prominent bulge in the front line left as the result of a fateful 
Soviet attack earlier in the year. If destroyed, Hitler would be able to re-establish initiative in 
the East, shorten his line, and bolster his positions elsewhere. Thus three entire German 
armies and the vast proportion of available tank strength including the entire German 
strategic reserve, was to be thrown against the salient. But after five days of brutal fighting, 
and as Field Marshal Von Manstein’s Panzer Corps advanced toward its climactic showdown 
with the Red Army’s 1st Tank Army near Prokhorovka on 10th July, Allied forces landed on 
Sicily. Kesselring reassured Hitler that counterattacks could hold the Anglo-US assault on the 
Island. Within two days, however, Hitler had ordered a halt to Citadel and directed that 
divisions now be sent toward Italy. On 17th July OKH (Oberkommando des Heeres) ordered 4 
divisions, including the elite II SS Panzer Corps and the Grossdeutschland mechanized 
infantry division, south.61 In the words of David M. Glantz, the foremost authority of the Red 
Army in World War II, ‘[T]he Sicilian invasion ultimately helped doom Operation Citadel’.62  
Husky’s impact was clear. Anglo-American action in the Mediterranean had served 
to fatally weaken Hitler’s chances of striking a significant blow against the Red Army. If one 
takes the view that victory at Kursk was a realistic prospect for German forces, then the 
obvious conclusion is that Hitler’s decision to call an early halt to the offensive was a wholly 
positive outcome for the Allies. A breakthrough would have would have dealt a huge blow 
against the Reich’s most potent land enemy at a crucial point in the war. However, not only 
was Citadel an open secret to the Russians who had prepared accordingly but, as Glantz 
states, the depth of those preparations and the resources accorded to them illustrates that 
Citadel was perceived not as a threat but as an opportunity. Ultimately the Russian intention 
at Kursk envisaged an initial absorption of the German assault to be then followed by the 
second phase of the operation; a vast counterattack designed to eliminate the German 
‘main groupings’ i.e. its potent armoured and mechanised formations.63 Seen in this light, 
Hitler’s decision to withdraw those divisions at a crucial point in order to respond to the 
landings in Sicily assumes an altogether different hue. At this critical juncture, rather than 
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sacrificing his reserves, Hitler was encouraged by Husky to halt that process, and divert his 
precious resources elsewhere.  
Such a reading of events is not intended to suggest that Husky was materially 
damaging to Allied interests. Certainly when one considers that by being forced to relinquish 
the initiative at Kursk, Hitler was condemned to lose it on the Eastern Front for the 
remainder of the war. But any analysis of the relationship between Husky and Citadel points 
the undeniable fact that the former ultimately prevented the potential destruction or 
degradation by the Red Army of further German divisions including its critical elite 
armoured formations. Formations that would, ironically, face the Allies in Normandy a year 
later.64 In that sense Husky is an example of Luttwak’s ‘contradiction’; a hugely successful 
enterprise, and one that caused immense danger to the entire Axis system, but which 
simultaneously contravened the maxim, ‘Never interfere with your enemy while he is 
making a mistake’.65  
    IV: Cause and Effect 
The historiography of Operation Husky frequently laments the Allied failure to inflict a 
decisive military defeat upon the Axis. It acknowledges however that it was at least decisive 
in a political sense, insofar that it was the final straw for Mussolini’s tottering regime. Seen 
in this light, the removal of Italy from the Axis alliance was more than enough to justify the 
faith placed in the operation by far sighted Allied leaders.66 But such a simplistic narrative 
obscures important questions in relation to the causality of Allied actions. It misreads the 
effect of Italian collapse upon the enemy system, and it fails to consider how activities 
designed to facilitate Husky as both a military and political endeavour came to condition 
German actions in the months following. Most crucially, it fails to consider the inevitable 
implications that those actions would have in return for Allied strategy. 
In relation to its effects therefore as an operation of war, Husky offers the following 
observations. Firstly, that the debate should adopt subtly different terminology; by 
substituting the term ‘decisive’ for that of ‘transformative’ one is able to reach a more 
accurate judgement of Husky’s true effect upon the Axis system. Secondly, that such an 
adjustment is necessary due to the fact that its potential for decisive effect was, 
counterintuitively, undermined by the very measures designed to enable it to succeed. 
Thirdly, that the resulting strategic ‘straightjacket’ that emerged post-Husky was the 
optimal outcome for the Allies. It may have contravened Strachan’s theoretical principles of 
good strategy making, but it was oddly pivotal in maintaining the harmony of Anglo-US 
relations at this critical stage in the war. 
                                                          
64 Specifically the 2nd SS Panzer Corps’ 1st and 2nd SS Panzer Divisions 
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The key to understanding the first of these propositions lies in acknowledging that to 
be truly decisive, Husky required a far greater impact than toppling Mussolini’s regime and 
even (ideally) destroying the entirety German of combat power on the Island. The collapse 
of the Italian Fascist regime may have caused temporary difficulties for German 
commanders and deprived them of the remaining - albeit very poor quality - Italian 
divisions, but such problems were fleeting. Indeed, such a development conferred a 
relatively greater advantage to the Germans than to the Allies. The defection/disintegration 
of the Italian Army and much of the Fascist state simply cleared the way for a German 
defence of the peninsular largely unhindered by competing demands and requirements and 
where purely military considerations counted.67 In other words Italian collapse replaced 
ambiguity with certainty; a development greeted with obvious relief by German 
commanders.68 As for the loss of German troops on Sicily, even a total victory would have 
conferred minimal advantage to the Allies in light of their pre-determined inability to 
immediately exploit their advantage post-Husky.69 In light of these points it can be argued 
that Husky was indecisive in both military and political terms. That is not to deny its evident 
effect. In that respect Husky was transformative, albeit in a balanced sense. On the one 
hand it toppled a Fascist icon and transformed Italy from enemy to partial ally. On the other 
it simultaneously transformed Germany’s problem from a complex political challenge to a 
more straightforward military one. 
In light of the above it can be argued that to be truly decisive Husky required the 
forcing of genuine change in German thinking; from one of narrow tactical considerations of 
where precisely to defend in southern Italy to one of entirely alternative strategies that 
might, for example, advocate the giving up of the majority of the mainland. But any such 
change would be fatally arrested by a significant obstacle; the logic of the actions 
undertaken to ensure Husky’s initial feasibility as a military operation. How this should be 
the case lies in tracing the uncertainty underpinning German decision-making during the 
period August-October 1943, during which Hitler’s views on the defence of Italy fluctuated 
between the advice provided by his two respective commanders in theatre; Kesselring and 
Rommel. The former, C-in-C South, advocated that Italy should be defended to the hilt.70 
The latter, appointed as Commander of Army Group B in Northern Italy two months 
previously, argued that German forces should be withdrawn and redistributed to other 
theatres, and that minimal resources be retained to protect remaining approaches through 
Italy’s mountainous north.71 Hitler’s views alternated between the two respective courses 
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of action proposed but, at the beginning of October 1943, German forces were instructed to 
hold the line in southern Italy.72 
The reason for Hitler’s decision lay not in Italy per se but in the Balkans. The 
importance of that region both to the German war effort and also to supposed Allied war 
aims not only dictated a strengthening of the German position there but, importantly, 
maintenance of a strong position in southern Italy. This would prevent the latter being used 
as a springboard onto the Dalmatian coast. 73 The significance of this strategic appreciation 
lies in the fact that it was conditioned by Allied deception operations, which suggested that 
the Balkans continued to be the target of their main assault into Europe. Such a feint had 
had been mounted prior to Husky in an effort to draw German forces away from Sicily, but 
continued subsequently in order to encourage the further dissipation of German forces 
away from Italy. Hitler’s linking of the occupation of southern Italy with the security of his 
Balkan flank dictated that Allied strategy suddenly lacked coherence.74 By seeking to fix the 
Germans in the Balkans the Allies had simultaneously fixed them in southern Italy, and by 
extension hampered their own ambitions to advance rapidly into Europe’s soft underbelly.  
Yet this unfortunate impasse has to be analysed with broader considerations in 
mind. For while the total commitment to battle imposed by the Germans in southern Italy 
now shouldered the Allies with the brutal realities of fighting through the length of the 
Italian peninsular, the alternative strategy over which Hitler had vacillated for two months 
had in fact offered them a far more troubling scenario: options. It has been argued that 
‘Good strategy provides options, not a straightjacket’, a proposition that would ordinarily 
be considered wholly incontrovertible.75 But in the context of Allied Mediterranean strategy 
in the summer of 1943 a straightjacket was precisely what was required. For the emergence 
of options merely raised the prospect of forcing competing and highly divisive perspectives 
on strategy back into the open, with potentially incalculable consequences for Allied unity. 
In particular, such a move would have revealed the confusion and incoherence present in 
British strategy at that critical juncture. While the passing of time may allow us to 
understand how sudden contradictions and discrepancies may have been ultimately 
resolved, British policymakers in the pressured atmosphere of late summer and early 
autumn of 1943 appeared thoroughly unprepared for such an eventuality. 
 The consequence of a German withdrawal from Italy and/or the redistribution of 
forces within was problematic for the British in two distinct ways. Firstly, if significant 
numbers of German divisions were withdrawn with relatively small numbers held back to 
contest the land routes out of Italy, Alanbrooke’s long-articulated vision of Italy acting as a 
                                                          
72 See Warlimont, 385. Hitler’s prevarication was reflected in the lack of accurate Allied intelligence as regards 
his intentions during this period. See TNA CAB 87/117 Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) memoranda (43) 381 
(0) 14 September 1943 
73 Warlimont, 385 
74 Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War, 71-103 
75 Hew Strachan quoted in Miller, 247 
 19 
magnet for German formations that might otherwise be employed in France would be 
rendered hollow.76 It would add to the misgivings of senior American strategists who still 
questioned the ability of British counterparts to provide a coherent justification for Italy’s 
central role in Allied strategy, and the vast military commitment required as a 
consequence.77 But if the effective abandonment of Italy by the Germans was unlikely, the 
more realistic prospect of withdrawal to the North still threatened immense military and 
political complications for the Allies. At the QUADRANT conference in Quebec in August 
1943 the British Chiefs of Staff recommended that if the opportunity were to present itself 
Allied forces should advance in strength to positions covering Milan and Turin.78 This, it was 
argued, would require the Germans to cease the re-allocation of forces to North-West 
Europe and cause significant amounts of their fighter strength to be deployed south in order 
to meet the threat posed by Allied strategic bombers operating from northern Italy. But 
such a proposal exposed significant flaws in thinking. Firstly it was of dubious accuracy with 
respect to the advantages for strategic airpower. Senior British planners admitted that Allied 
bombers operating from airbases located so close the Alps would be hampered by the 
savagely steep climb required to clear the mountaintops en-route to targets in Southern 
Germany; targets moreover which were already within range of bombers operating from 
the UK.79 Secondly, an advance so far into northern Italy visualised force ratios that were 
entirely incompatible with agreements already reached over the allocation of forces for 
OVERLORD the following year. The Italian peninsular widens dramatically at its neck, tripling 
the length of any front line to be held by the Allies. As a consequence, pressure could only 
be maintained north of the Apennines if the agreement reached by the Combined Chiefs at 
the May 1943 TRIDENT Conference regarding the numbers of divisions to be devoted to 
Overlord was torn up, and those divisions earmarked for France retained instead in the 
Mediterranean. At Quebec, however, the US Chiefs of Staff explicitly prohibited any 
weakening in the agreed commitment to Overlord, to the evident dismay of their British 
counterparts who remained convinced of the need to react to changing circumstances in 
Italy.80 But so problematic was the prospect of advancing as far as Milan and Turin in 
military terms that Sir John Kennedy, Britain’s Director of Military Operations, had already 
admitted in private that it was unfeasible at that point for Allied armies to operate north of 
the Apennine range.81  
A German withdrawal therefore stood to create genuine problems for Allied 
planners, British in particular, who in turn exhibited real uncertainty as to how they might 
react to such a development. Although both the US and British Chiefs of Staff were in 
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accordance over the requirement for an Italian campaign as a secondary theatre, there was 
a clear difference of opinion on the crucial matter of how to react to sudden changes in 
strategic circumstances should they occur. US planners remained fixed in their 
determination any Allied reaction be governed by the availability of divisions agreed at 
TRIDENT. 82 British military Chiefs, on the other hand, were of the opinion that forces be 
made available to capitalise upon whatever opportunities revealed themselves.  
Most significantly perhaps, the latter’s opinion was shared by Churchill, whose 
determination at this point to maintain maximum pressure on the Italian front was evident. 
Obviously such considerations can be painted as mere speculation, but the prospect of 
Churchill’s political opportunism being ignited by sudden opportunities in the 
Mediterranean has already been exposed. David Reynolds, perhaps the pre-eminent 
historian of Anglo-US relations during this period, states that Churchill’s ‘cover-up’ on the 
matter of favouring a commitment to Italy at the possible expense of OVERLORD at this 
point was, ‘[T]he most blatant piece of distortion in the six volumes of his memoirs’. Indeed, 
he proposes that Churchill and his Chiefs came close, in early October 1943, ‘to throwing 
Overlord overboard’.83  
As Reynolds argues, Churchill’s may publicly have given the impression that Overlord 
was never in doubt, but evidence suggest otherwise. His determination to seek any 
advantage in the Mediterranean and Balkans during this period could be seen in his 
obstinate championing of an ill-fated offensive in the Dodecanese in the autumn of 1943, 
and his anger at being held to the decision for a May 1944 date for Overlord was evident.84 
The official history reveals that on the 19th October he instructed his staff to conduct a 
secret study of the situation in the Mediterranean with changes to force commitments for 
Overlord in mind.85 In a telegram to his Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden the following week, 
he exclaimed that Allied fortunes were being dictated by agreements persisted in without 
due regard to changing circumstances.86  He finished by acknowledging that, in giving 
Eisenhower and Alexander what they required to win the battle in Italy, “[T]his may 
certainly affect the date of Overlord”.87 The Americans noted with unease that Eden himself 
was heavily in favour of using Italy as a stepping stone into the Balkans.88 Similar turmoil 
was reflected by Churchill’s Staff, who exhibited intense frustration at being prevented from 
capitalising upon opportunities in the Mediterranean due to the rigid commitment to 
                                                          
82 See Chartwell Papers Churchill College, Cambridge [Hereafter referred to as CHAR], 23/12 Official War 
Cabinet: Quadrant. Records of meetings and proceedings, 9 
83 David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (Cambridge, 
2005), 379- 381 
84 TNA CAB 119/145, War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean’, 7 
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85J.  Ehrman, 113-15 
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20/130/89 Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff, 26 December 1943. 
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Stimson affirmed that Eden, ‘[W]ished the Allies to invade the Balkans’. Strategic Planning, 215 
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Overlord.89 Alanbrooke spent much of the autumn of 1943 lamenting US short-sightedness 
while Sir John Kennedy, now Assistant Chief of the Imperial General Staff, suggested that 
the British would, ‘if circumstances changed’, ensure that relevant forces remained in Italy 
even at the expense of Overlord.90  
The most important issue at play however is not whether as a consequence of 
different German choices in Italy at this point the Anglo-US alliance would definitely have 
been damaged, or that Overlord would certainly have been delayed with obvious yet 
incalculable consequences. Such claims are of course entirely speculative. What is more 
important is the logic of our understanding of these debates. They reveal that Allied strategy 
in Italy post-Husky accorded not to the neat principles of ends, ways and means but to the 
more elemental forces of unpredictability and contingency. This is not to say that Allied 
strategy lacked coherence. On the contrary, if defined by the visions of those such as 
Alanbrooke, Eisenhower and Churchill, then Allied strategy in Italy exhibited a thoroughly 
firm understanding of how military operations should satisfy a range of political goals. But 
that is only half of the equation. It was only once Hitler decided to defend southern Italy 
that Allied strategy was able to function effectively. Yet that decision was itself dependent 
upon a series of events and considerations, decisions and outcomes, political and military, 
across space and time, that were largely beyond Allied control. Allied strategy at this crucial 
point functioned, in reality, at the mercy of contingency. 
 
VI: Conclusion 
As a military operation Husky deserves the attention accorded to it on the basis of its 
complexity, the brutality of the fighting, and its role in facilitating the entry of Anglo-
American forces onto mainland Europe. From a more heightened perspective its centrality 
to Anglo-US debates on the importance of the Mediterranean theatre in World War II 
confers further weight as to its value as a topic of study. But our understanding of Husky as 
an operation of war should be encouraged to evolve further. Poised at an intersection 
between Allied and Axis strategy at this crucial juncture in the war, Husky allows us to 
explore a range of factors posed by theorists and historians and which serve to inform our 
thinking about how strategy plays out in reality. Importantly, addressing matters from a 
theoretical perspective only reinforces the importance of the historical. Theory may offer 
important insights, but those insights rely absolutely upon an accurate reading of events at 
all levels of war – tactical, operational and strategic. In such a way military history ceases 
the potential tendency to speak only to itself, and serves instead to properly inform 
intellectual debate. 
                                                          
89 TNA CAB/65/40/6 OZ 3384 ‘Future Operations’ 147th Conclusions, Minute 1 Confidential annex 27 October 
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90 See Danchev, Todman, 465, and Kennedy, 299. 
 22 
That debate is a crucial one. Indeed it is a timeless one, concerned as it is with the 
ability of strategy to guide the emergence of desired outcomes. What Husky illustrates in 
this regard not only provides weight to observations as to the often random and 
unpredictable nature of strategy  as a concept, but also the way in which our own 
theoretical understanding of its principles and ideals is shown to be vulnerable when 
exposed to the harsh reality of war. In particular the ways in which political expediency 
subverted the hypothetical paradigm of effective strategy-making from one where 
objectives were set, and then sought by military action, to one whereby military action was 
instead utilised to identify those objectives in the first place. So too the ways in which 
‘good’ strategy could be entirely contextual. Strategy post-Husky was best served not by 
flexibility and ‘options’ but by the strict constraints of alliance politics; constraints that may 
have confined available courses of action but which in so doing facilitated the continuing 
harmony of  a war winning relationship.  
In the final analysis, the question might be raised as to whether Husky’s success was 
due to its successful flouting of the guidelines for successful strategy, or whether success 
was so dependent upon non-events and uncontrollable factors that it was to all intents and 
purposes a matter of fortune as to whether the Allies prevailed or not. In retrospect, the 
fact that the invasion of Sicily and subsequent events in Italy roughly accorded with prior 
Allied intentions and objectives suggests a degree of rational control on their part that 
outweighed the vagaries of chance. But it must also be acknowledged that events, 
particularly with respect to Husky’s genesis and aftermath, played out not simply because of 
rational operational or strategic choices on the part of respective operational and political 
commanders, but because of the always unpredictable and contingent nature of strategy 
itself. In such ways Operation Husky and its aftermath provides interesting food for thought 
for both the theorist and the historian. Borne of confusion and compromise, flawed in 
execution, and indecisive in terms of effect, it was a hugely successful endeavour. Irony or 
paradox? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
Bibliography 
Simon Ball, Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the Mediterranean (London, Harper 
Press, 2010)  ‘ 
Simon Ball, ‘The Mediterranean and North Africa’ in J. Ferris and E. Mawdsley, The 
Cambridge History of the Second World War Volume 1: Fighting the War (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2015) 358-389.  
M.K.Barbier, ‘The War in the West 1943-45’ in Ferris and Mawdsley, The Cambridge History 
of the Second World War Volume 1: Fighting the War (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 389-419 
Nial Barr, Yanks and Limeys (Vintage, London, 2016) 
Niall Barr, Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein (Pimlico, London 2005). 
Richard K. Betts, ‘Is Strategy an Illusion?’ International Security, 25:2 (2000) 37 
Martin Blumenson, Sicily, Whose Victory? (Ballantine, 1972). 
R.M. Citino, ‘Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction’, The American Historical 
Review Vol. 112, No. 4 (Oct, 2007), 1070-1  
Alex Danchev, Dan Todman, Alanbrooke: War Diaries (Wiedenfield and Nicholson, London, 
2002) 
Frederick Deakin, Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Collapse of Italian Fascism 
(Harper and Row, London, 1962) 
Carlo D’Este Bitter Victory (Harper, London, 2008) 
Harold Deutsch, Denis Showalter (eds) What if? Strategic Alternatives of World War II 
(Chicago, Emperor Press 1997). 
 Antulio Echavarria II, ‘Preparing for One War and Getting Another?’ Strategic Studies 
Institute, (Carlisle, PA,  2010) 
John Ehrman,The History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy Vol V (HMSO, London 
1956) 
 24 
Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) 
Michael Handel (ed) Strategic and Operational Deception in the Second World War (Frank 
Cass, London 1987). 
David M. Glantz, Jonathan House, The Battle of Kursk (University Press, Kansas, 1999) 
David M.Glantz, ‘The Nature of Soviet Operational Art’ Parameters 15/1 Spring 1985, 2-13 
Julian Jackson, The Fall of France: The Nazi Invasion of 1940 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001),  
Helmut Heiber and David M. Glantz, Hitler and his Generals: Military Conferences 1942-
1945 (Greenhill Books, London, 2002)                                                                                                                                                                                          
F. H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and 
Operations Volumes 2 (HMSO, London 1981), and volume 3, Part 1 (HMSO, London 1984),  
Field Service Regulations: Operations, Higher Formations (HMSO, London, 1935) 14 
Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (Greenhill Books, 
London, 1993),  
Michael Howard, Strategic Deception in the Second World War (Pimlico, London, 1990) 
Michael Howard,  The Use and Abuse of Military History, RUSI Journal, 107/625 (1962) 
Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Volume 4: September 1942-August 1943, (HMSO, London 
1970)  
Sir John Kennedy, The Business of War (Walter Millis, London, 1958) 
Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace , (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge Massachusetts, 2002)  
Jovan Marjanović, Mihailo Stanišić, The Collaboration of D. Mihailović's Chetniks with the 
enemy forces of occupation: 1941-1944 (Arhivski Pregled, Beograd, 1976)  
Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-44 (Centre for Military 
History, US Army, 1994), 
Stephen Miller, ‘On Strategy Grand and Mundane’ Orbis 60:2 (Spring 2016)  
 25 
Mitcham and Stauffenberg The Battle of Sicily: How the Allies Lost Their Chance for Total 
Victory (Stackpole, New York, 2007).  
Klaus Jurgen-Muller ‘A German perspective on Allied Deception operations in the Second 
World War’ in Intelligence and National Security 2/3 (1987)  
Peter Paret, ‘The History of War’ Daedelus, 100/2 (1971), 376-396 
Peter Paret Understanding War, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993) 
Hugh Pond Sicily (Kimber, London 1962)  
Douglas Porch Hitler’s Mediterranean Gamble: The North African and the Mediterranean 
Campaigns in World War II (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2004),  
Patrick Porter, A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in World War Two’ Journal of 
Strategic Studies 35/3 (2012) 
David Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World 
War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005)  
Theodore Ropp, ‘The Teaching of Military History’ Military Affairs, 13/1 (1949). 
Thomas Schelling The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1960) 
Denis Smyth, Deathly Deception: The Real Story of Operation Mincemeat (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010)  
Hew Strachan, ‘The Study of War at Oxford 1909-2009’ in C. Hood, D. King and G. Peele, 
Forging a Discipline: A Critical Assessment of Oxford's Development of the Study of Politics 
and International Relations in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014). 
Hew Strachan The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, 2012).  
Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London, Weidenfield and Nicholson 1962) 
 26 
Gerhard Weinberg World at Arms: a Global History of World War II (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1994)  
Harry R. Yarger, ‘Toward A Theory Of Strategy: Art Lykke And The Army War College 
Strategy Model,’ in U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd 
ed., ed. J. Boone Bartholomees (Department of National Security and Strategy, Carlisle 
Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 
 
